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Abstract 
The field of narrative studies is currently influencing methodology in many areas of research and 
learning in the arts and social sciences - historiography, psychology, philosophy, theology, therapy and 
education amongst others.  Researchers in these domains have used narrative theory to help them 
examine how narratives concerning professionals are constructed, and what this tells us of the 
professionals themselves, their view of their profession, their place within it, and their relations with 
clients.  Most of these studies emphasise the teleological role that narrative inquiry can play in 
providing individuals with the opportunities to achieve new understandings about the nature and 
process of practice and the communities within such practice is enacted. 
 
This article describes the application of aspects of narrative theory to legal education.  It describes the 
use to which narrative criticism was put in a third level module on clinical legal skills at Glasgow 
Caledonian University.  Some key concepts in narrative theory were used in class discussion of 
videotaped client counselling interviews between solicitors and clients.  The narrative concepts were 
also reinforced in other areas of the module dealing with negotiation and writing skills.  Through the 
discussion of the videotapes and reflective practice using recipes, students came to a deeper 
appreciation of the experience of one important aspect of legal practice.   
 
 
 
[T]he study of narrative, like the study of other 
significant human creations, has taken a quantum leap in 
the modern era.  No longer the province of literary 
specialists who borrow their terms from psychology and 
linguistics, the study of narrative has become an 
invaluable source of insight for all the branches of 
human and natural science’.2   
 
 
 
Why is there such a rush to storytelling?  Why has narrative become such an 
important and recurring theme in legal scholarship these days? 
 
It is with this question that the editor Kim Lane Scheppele opened the Foreword to a 
special issue in 1989 of the Michigan Law Review on the place of narrative in legal 
discourse.  Throughout the eighties and especially in America there was a steady 
growth in the number of articles and books concerned with law and narrative; and in 
the nineties there has been no slackening of interest: narrative and especially narrative 
theory remains a recurring interest for lawyers.  There are two clear strands to the 
research.  First, the law and literature movement has used narrative theory to analyse 
the relations between literature and law, and to critique the place of law in society.  
Second, those involved in ‘critical lawyering’, clinical skills, and the ethnography of 
legal discourse have employed narrative theory teleologically in order to open up new 
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understandings of the operation of law practice and legal education.3  As Scheppele 
points out, ‘narrative is a way of organising, coping with, even acting on the world’.4  
As a result the substantial bodies of theory which seek to explain how narrative 
operates are powerful tools for enabling understanding in any particular discipline.   
 
In the first section of this article I will describe some key aspects of narrative theory 
relevant to legal client counselling.  The second section will illustrate some uses to 
which the study of narrative has been put in a variety of disciplines; and then examine 
the place of narrative theory in the research literature dealing with client counselling.  
In the third section, I describe how narrative criticism was embedded and used within 
a level three undergraduate client counselling class.5   
 
 
Reader-response and point of view 
The variety of critical approaches to narrative is vast; but in the heuristics of the client 
counselling class one approach was employed, that of reader-response theory as it is 
presented in the work of Wolfgang Iser in particular.  Iser’s theory of reading explores 
the reader’s engagement with the text, and focuses on issues such as the place of 
intentionality in the creation and reading of texts, and ways in which readers create 
and structure meaning from texts.  One issue amongst these was particularly relevant 
to the class, that of ‘indeterminacies’ within texts.  According to Iser, texts are full of 
gaps or blanks in their structures of meaning, much as there are gaps in conversational 
dialogues.  A reader will respond to a gap by making 
his own decision as to how the gap is to be filled.  In this very act the dynamics 
of reading are revealed.  By making his decision he implicitly acknowledge the 
inexhaustibility of the text; at the same time it is this very inexhaustibility that 
forces him to make his decision.6   
This decision is rarely fixed: re-readings of the text, changes in the reader’s 
circumstances and readings of the text within new contexts can alter it.  As Iser 
describes it, the process is hermeneutic:  
[t]he text provokes certain expectations which in turn we project onto the text in 
such a way that we reduce the polysemantic possibilities to a single 
interpretation in keeping with the expectations aroused, thus extracting an 
individual, configurative meaning.7   
Expectation and interpretation are thus interlinked and constantly acting on each 
other.  In this sense, reading a text is similar to experiencing real life, where ideas are 
formed by the interaction of anticipation and memory.  This process is not a smooth 
one, though.  Gaps and indeterminacies attract us by their quality of interrupting the 
flow of meaning creation within us.  As Iser has it,  
[w]e look forward, we look back, we decide, we change our decisions, we form 
expectations, we are shocked by their nonfulfillment, we question, we muse, we 
accept, we reject: this is the dynamic process of recreation.8 
 
Implicit in the reader-response enterprise is the notion of viewpoint and authority.  
We cannot read a text unless from a point of view, and our situation as reader 
inevitably affects our sense of the authority of what we read.  As Ian Reid put it,  
‘narratorial authority is always at stake in a storytelling situation, whatever the 
tactical variations’.9  Our knowledge of the author and his or her previous writings 
and viewpoints always affects our reading; and if we know little of this, we construct 
and reconstruct authorial voice and context from textual details.  This applies to our 
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reading of what we might regard as a functional text such as a memo or legal 
judgement as well as a literary work such as a novel.   
 
It also applies to the readings of a community of readers.  Indeed, it was precisely this 
difficulty of accounting for differences and similarities in interpretive readings within 
a community of readers which led another critic, Stanley Fish, to develop his concept 
of ‘interpretive communities’ - that is, communities of readers who share practices 
and ways of communicating meaning.  As Fish describes it,  
[i]nterpretive communities are no more than sets of institutional practices; and 
while those practices are continually being transformed by the very work that 
they do, the transformed practice identifies itself and tells its story in relation to 
general purposes and goals that have survived and form the basis of a 
continuity.10 
As Fish pointed out, we are always in a world where there are constraints ‘in the form 
of imperatives, urgencies and prohibitions that come along with any point of view 
(and being in a point of view is not something one can avoid)’.  Fish gives us a 
practical example of such situated point of view:  
When Judge Parker sits down to consider Mills v Wyman he is in no sense 
“free” to see the facts in any way he pleases; rather his very first look is 
informed (constrained) by the ways of thinking that now fill his consciousness 
as a result of his initiation into the professional community of jurists.11 
 
If Iser’s concept of indeterminacy contributes to our sense of how meaning is created, 
Fish’s analysis of the concept of the interpretive community contributes to our sense 
of how that meaning is constrained in practice.  As we shall see, these concepts were 
used in the client counselling class described below to enable students to carry out 
effectively not only analysis of client counselling but the practice of it as well.   
 
 
Narrative theory and other disciplines 
Narrative theory has been taken up by disciplines outwith literary theory, and for 
some time now has been deployed to open up new areas within disciplines.  Two 
example will suffice.   
 
In education, narrative studies has become a powerful tool for the analysis of 
practitioners’ experiences and of teacher education.12  For influential researchers such 
as Elbaz, and Connolly and Clandinin, the professional knowledge of teachers is not 
static and contextless cognitive knowledge.  Rather, it is practical knowledge, 
instrumental in shaping situations and experiences, and shaped by these also.13  This 
has led to the gradual development of a distinctive educational ethnography, one 
where the goal of research is to understand and represent the subject’s, that is, the 
practitioner’s, experiences and narratives.  In this ethnography, information is 
collected using interviews and observation and dialogue.   
 
This is also the case for lines of research in the field of social work.  For some 
ethnographers there, narrative theory has provided an opening in which they can 
explore the social construction of meaning.14  Instead of the reportage of an 
apparently objective experience.  In this type of ethnography, the interpretation of the 
subject’s experience moves to the centre of the study.  Gubrium and Holstein, for 
example, used narratives to explore the quality of life reality we have narratives which 
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emphasise polyphony and the participants’ own representations of their of nursing 
home residents.15  Instead of relying upon statistical analyses derived from 
questionnaires to determine quality of life for nursing home residents, they 
encouraged the residents to tell their own stories in their own words.  They contrasted 
their methodology with that of other professionals in the field:  
[t]he legal and mental health agents who participate in involuntary mental 
hospitalization hearings define and consider a candidate patient’s dangerousness 
or so-called grave disability in terms of professional and organisational interests 
and agendas.16 
The result was an enriched contextual study of the experience of recipients of care, 
one that added significantly to the body of more traditional, objectivist research   
 
Versions of the above methodological approaches have been applied in the domain of 
law and, particularly in the last fifteen years, in the field of client counselling.  Two 
distinct approaches are discernible in the field.  First there are the student and 
practitioner texts on client counselling, those which advise upon and illustrate, 
according to the paradigm of skills and strategies, best practice in client counselling 
and ways to achieve this.17  Relying to a greater or lesser extent on research into skills 
development, these texts tend to focus more on generic behaviours which will enable 
students and trainees to become what some of the texts define as client-centred 
lawyers.  Second, there is a substantial and growing body of research into the actual 
relationships between clients and lawyers.  William Felstiner and Austin Sarat’s 
influential analyses of lawyer-client relations were based on the first large-scale 
ethnographic survey of this field.  Using 115 recorded interviews derived from forty 
divorce cases studied over thirty-three months, they observed the typical patterns of 
inter-relationships as these emerged.  Thus, for example, commenting on the 
understanding which lawyers and their clients develop of each other’s role, they 
observed -  
[c]lients focus their interpretive energy in efforts to construct an explanation of 
the past and of their marriage’s failure.  Lawyers avoid responding to these 
interpretations because they do not consider that who did what to whom in the 
marriage is relevant to the legal task of dissolving it.  In this domain clients 
largely talk past their lawyers, and interpretive activity proceeds without the 
generation and ratification of a shared understanding of reality.18 
In Felstiner and Sarat’s studies we can see the ‘interpretive community’ of lawyers, as 
Fish would define it, come under scrutiny from a variety of points of view.  The 
investigation of client point of view via client narrative and interchange is one reason 
their research has been significant in the field, and has become valuable reading for 
those interested in client counselling education.   
 
Where Felstiner and Sarat based their conclusions upon an ethnographic survey, 
others have written about their own experiences such as client disempowerment and 
silencing, the distortion of client narrative and the alienation of client experience.19  
While a wide range of research techniques is employed by this body of research, and 
conclusions differ, what is remarkable is the extent to which it employs the tropes of 
narrative enquiry.  One example will serve here.  In one of his articles Clark D. 
Cunningham describes his methodology here and elsewhere as ‘a Geertzian thick 
description, focusing on key words and offering possible explications of their broader 
and more complex meanings as constructions of social reality’.  He acknowledged the 
influence of the German sociologist Beatrice Caesar-Wolf’s study of the methods by 
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which a judge ‘transformed lay testimony into “adjudicable evidence”’ by 
transmuting ‘fragmented testimony into “a thematically coherent, sequentially 
presented story”’ [his emphasis].  To do this, ‘Caesar-Wolf subjected the transcript of 
the hearing to “extensive and exhaustive content analysis with regard to the ... largely 
latent meaning structures, which may not be necessarily intended by the parties 
involved”’.20  Cunningham’s resumption of Caesar-Wolf’s method, his description of 
his own, and the methodologies adopted by many other researchers in this field, show 
a sophisticated awareness of the potentialities of narrative theory to act as a criticism 
of legal discourse and practice. 
 
Nor is this research oriented towards the courts and professional practice alone.  Some 
of it deals with client counselling education in students’ clinics, for example, or 
examines student response to clinical work.  Most of the research has relevance for 
the teaching of client counselling and beyond.  As Carrie Menkel-Meadows declared 
of the whole context of client counselling,  
I believe that with a focus on empathy training through perspective-taking, role-
playing, simulation, and other forms of less conventional legal education, we 
can actually increase lawyers’ awareness that they live in the world with other 
people who often have needs as legitimate or even more legitimate than those of 
lawyers or their clients.21 
 
 
Clinical Legal Skills Module 
At Glasgow Caledonian University students studying for a BA in Law with 
Administrative Studies are currently introduced to client counselling in the third year 
of their degree, in a module entitled Clinical Legal Skills.  The module sets out to 
enable students to understand and apply in their work the basic principles of client 
counselling, legal writing and document drafting, negotiation skills, and - linking up 
with their fourth year Honours dissertation - advanced research skills.22   
 
While students do to some extent practise personal transferable skills in other law 
modules, this module is different from most others the students study in that there is a 
strong personal element to the material they study, and in the activities in which they 
take part.  This personal commitment to the module is emphasised, for much of the 
learning on this course involves students analysing the way they habitually respond to 
other people, and the ways they think about their selves and their self-presentations in 
society.   
 
The module is divided into five separate units, four of which are the focus of class 
activity, with each unit taking up three weeks of class time.  This is done so that, in a 
relatively unfamiliar learning environment, students may be able to focus more clearly 
on individual skill development.  This goes against the grain of some clinical 
education theory, which holds that the most valuable learning takes place when 
students are flung in medias res, and where the learning ground and activity most 
closely approximates the situation of professional tasks.  In this respect the linear path 
of the module would seem to contradict the polysemic quality of professional life 
where the practitioner often carries out multiple and quite different tasks involving 
different audiences and readerships.  In part this impression is given by the student 
handbook, which sets out in detail the learning outcomes, forms of teaching and 
learning strategies, module reading and content, all of which conforms to a semester 
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pattern.  Nevertheless, in spite of the apparent linearity of the module, it is designed to 
be learned not sequentially but consequentially - one skill overlapping another - so 
that the module forms a unified whole.  Some scenarios or role plays appear in 
different units, while the negotiation skills project is built upon work begun in the unit 
on client counselling and incorporates skills learned in legal writing and document 
drafting.   
 
The module is assessed with a variety of instruments.  Students are asked to complete 
a 1500 word self-appraisal report.23  They base this report on a learning log which 
they are issued with in the module handbook at the start of the module, and which 
they use during and after each session.  Legal writing and document drafting is 
assessed by a three hour open book examination in which students can answer an 
(unseen) paper anywhere on campus.  Negotiation skills are assessed in an email 
negotiation project based on the law of delict.  The last unit, advanced legal research 
skills, is compulsory but unassessed.  For their client counselling assessment students 
make at least two videotapes, choose their best performance and write a 1,000 word 
report on it.  Students are assessed out of a total of 25%, 10% being allocated to the 
video and 15% to the report.  The weighting, in favour of the report, is designed to 
encourage students to use the concepts of reflective practice: even if their best 
performance on tape is not particularly good, they can still pass the unit if they write 
an appraisal which is analytical and sensitive to the whole context of the experience, 
from the point of view of both the counsellor and the client.  
 
The assessment of client counselling skills is an integral part of the learning process 
carried out in class.  The class activities are structured around the same activities, 
which take place in broadly speaking the same order.  After reviewing the previous 
session, we then either practise the day’s role play, or else view excerpts from a video 
of a simulated role play, or a real solicitor-client interview.24  Following the interview, 
the class appraise the solicitor’s interviewing skills, and take notes on this.   
 
The students’ role play is the central activity of the class.25  It involves an unseen 
scenario, normally lasting no more than half an hour and usually less, with other 
students playing the part of clients.  The student counsellors work in pairs with their 
client(s); and once the client leaves, the counsellors spend five minutes or so, still on 
camera, discussing the case with each other.  In this period they focus on their 
perception of the practical action necessary on completion of the interview (follow-up 
action, information contacts and the like); the professional aspects of the meeting 
(possible ways the case could go, likely success or failure of modes of action, conflict 
of interest, etc), and the affective elements generated by the interview - what were the 
client’s feelings during the narrative and interview, what did they think of these, how 
did they feel they had handled the client, how could this have been improved, and so 
on.  The class, client and counsellors then appraise the interview, with the counsellors 
leading this particular part of the class.  This is emphasised as being the most 
important part of the whole session, both for the interview participants and the rest of 
the class.  Finally, the class spend the last ten minutes or so completing their learning 
log for that session. 
 
 
The use of narrative strategies in the counselling class 
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The main theoretical underpinning of the module is the work of Donald Schön.  For 
Schön, professional artistry is a form of 'reflection-in-action', and it plays a central 
role in the description of professional capability.  Because legal practice is an 
'indeterminate zone of practice', the concept of the reflective practitioner is 
particularly relevant; and therefore reflective practice is one main aim of the module 
(Schön, 1988, p.6).26  Such reflection-in-action is a conscious construction and 
reconstruction of the world.  In this sense, the indeterminacy of the zone is an analogy 
of the indeterminacy of the text discussed earlier.  Schön pointed up the interpretive 
bases common to both domains -  
when practitioners respond to the indeterminate zones of practice by holding a 
reflective conversation with the materials of their situations, they remake a part 
of their practice world and thereby reveal the usually tacit processes of 
worldmaking that underlie all of their practice.27 
This underlying ‘worldmaking’ was made explicit to students in discussions of 
extracts from Schön’s text, and others on the process of legal education.  Rather than 
discuss legal practice, of which the students had little experience, we discussed 
reflection in the context of their experience of the degree programme to date, and 
alternative forms of legal education.28   
 
The concepts of reflective practice, then, were made overt within class discussions, 
and were explicit aims and guided activities within the module.  In contrast, the 
narrative heuristics were left deliberately floating in the module structure, though I 
knew they would be used at some point during the class.  They were not therefore, 
from the students’ point of view, a visible part of the superstructure of the module, 
nor were they intended to have been.  As Julian Webb has pointed out, for all that the 
objectivist mode of aims and objectives is helpful in clarifying a class, syllabus or 
curriculum structure for a student, teaching is also a craft.  Part of its artistry lies in 
the decisions of the teacher regarding where and when to deploy certain devices and 
debates; and this can often be decided upon only when both students and teacher are 
within the situation.29  If this is true of substantive law courses, it is even more true of 
clinical legal skills courses.  There, legal learning is experiential and integrative.  
Much of the learning that goes on arises from the situation as it develops within and 
between the class and teacher, and instructional strategies should enable this learning 
to take place at variable rate, but in an organised way that provides a coherent 
structure for learning.  The narrative strategies therefore remained - if we might adopt 
a software analogy - ‘system-only files’, and unseen by the end-user.   
 
There is another reason why narrative techniques remained embedded within the 
structure of the system.  To a high degree, as we have seen above, the concepts of 
narrative theory and its related topoi arise within another discipline, that of literary 
theory.  If students were to use this theory in an overt way, or if they were presented 
with a teacher who used such theory, they would first have to come to an 
understanding of the theory.  The classes would then have been laden with theory 
which students would then have had to transfer not only to legal learning within a 
clinical legal education class (itself a new experience), but to their own individual 
experience.  This would have resulted in cognitive overload for students.30  It would 
also have resulted in the unnecessary isolation of theory from practice, and a classic 
instance of Schön’s technical-rationality model of learning. 
 
 8 
The concepts of narrative theory were embedded within class discussion and role 
play, therefore, and it was a rule of play never to introduce a concept unless there was 
first an example from a student’s work - writing or role play - which gave rise to 
cognitive dissonance within the class.  When there is such dissonance, and an 
uncertainty as to how to proceed, then students are receptive to new ideas.  Sometimes 
they arrived at these ideas themselves, and it remained for me to highlight the 
innovatory nature of their solutions to the problem.   
 
There is a difficulty associated with this approach, of course - that of the ‘hidden 
curriculum’ within a class.  As defined by Sockett this can apply to three of the 
negotiated areas between teacher and learner within a curriculum: the lore received by 
students about a class from other students; what students actually learn, as opposed to 
what their teachers may assume they are learning; and the hidden agendas of 
teachers.31 The last occurs when a teacher’s attitude to a certain knowledge base 
remains unclear or hidden from students, who then are put in the position of having to 
second-guess the teacher’s preferences.  This role only reinforces the passive role that 
students may play within a class.  In a clinical legal skills class it contributes little to 
the self-development of students.   
 
There is, however, a key distinction between the embedded use of narrative 
techniques, and the deficiencies of the hidden curriculum.  In the latter, students are 
often working within the ‘teaching as telling’ theory of learning, and seeking to 
discover preferences in order to replicate them, very often so as to obtain good 
assessment grades.32  In Clinical Legal Skills, however, students were presented with 
tools and concepts, a way of seeing, which they were encouraged to use.  By using 
narrative techniques students became apprentices: the rhetorical category of imitatio is 
one model of this.  Donald Schön’s concept of imitation is another:  
...Follow me! tends often to evoke negative reactions in coach and student 
alike, whenever it becomes explicit.  Yet imitation is essential to learning, just 
insofar as students are initially unaware of what they need to learn, and it can 
be a creative act of considerable complexity. 
 
Paradoxically, it is blind imitation, rather than imitation as such, that most 
threatens a student's autonomy; and it is blind imitation that students and 
coaches encourage when they keep imitation tacit.  In order to encourage 
reflective imitation, coaches may need to invite students to reflect on their 
negative attitudes toward imitation.33 
 
Most of the module was composed of workshops where students could carry out the 
procedural skills involved in putting reader-response and point-of-view into practice.  
Students readily grasped the general principle - that reader-response and point of view 
is crucial to effective lawyering - but found it much harder to practise it.  In the legal 
writing unit, for example, most of the activities were aimed at sensitising students to 
their audience’s needs, awareness, textual expectations and levels of comprehension.  
Part of the problem here is that students at university generate most of their text for a 
highly artificial audience, namely tutors, whose knowledge of the subject domain is 
greater than the students.  As a result of this and other factors, students tend to focus 
largely on textual content and pay little attention to reader response or expectation.  In 
legal practice, the situation is often the reverse: trainees find they are writing (and 
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speaking) to a wide variety of audience response and expectations, and they require to 
learn sensitivity to the complexities of reader-response.   
 
To enable students to learn this, writing activities were designed to call up reader-
response in the writer, so that students wrote letters and memos which were reader-
centred rather than writer-centred.  Several criteria were used.  The activities were 
always designed so that either audience needs were well-defined, or else were ill-
defined and required definition by the students.  The concept of safe and dangerous 
readers was also introduced: students discussed what constituted a misreading of a 
text then discussed situations in which readers can misread dangerously and for what 
ends.  Reader-motivation was also introduced, and all this was practised in activities 
where students had to write memos and letters to specific audiences with specific 
requirements.34  Students also learned what level of detail is appropriate in a text - that 
is to say, what information may be given and what remain unwritten.  In these 
activities they learned to place and control textual detail, and to create their own 
indeterminacy in a text.35  Thus the level of detail required in a pursuer’s letter to a 
defender intimating a delictual claim would be substantially less than the density of 
detail in letters further down the chain of correspondence.  Many students found that 
these workshops improved their writing.  One wrote in her self-appraisal report: 
 
I normally do not even consider the audience to whom my essay is addressed.  
By analysing other legal essays I found I could think more about how I should 
structure a legal argument to make it more effective. 
 
Audience sensitivity and point of view were key themes in the client counselling 
module too, and most of the workshops gave students practice in developing such 
sensitivity.  Little in students’ previous classes prepared them for this.  In their 
adjectival and substantive law classes they did not face living clients who told 
narratives where fact and law appears irremediably confused.  Much of their time was 
spent reading and learning from legal texts, from which the original client narrative 
that gave rise to the case law has long since disappeared.  In place of the client 
narrative was an eloquent flow of legal description and analysis which aimed to 
provide a neutral, objective and privileged view of events.  As Kim Lane Scheppele 
remarked of this voice, its ‘very “point-of-viewlessness” gives it its power’.36  This 
point-of-viewlessness, as Scheppele observes, is typical of an objectivist theory of 
truth, a theory which holds that it is possible to give a version of events that really 
happened, as opposed to the variants of what happened given by different parties.  
This theory, of course, is opposed by most legal narrative theorists, for whom point of 
view, stance, and the rhetorical nature of truth are crucial components in legal 
practice.   
 
They are also the components which cause students real perplexity.  In their 
discussions of videotapes students often revealed how uncertain they were about 
dealing with point of view.  The following excerpt from an interview between 
solicitor and client on the subject of divorce, viewed by students during a workshop 
and then discussed by them, gives an example of their difficulties, and the solutions 
that narrative techniques can provide: 
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solicitor .....The defences then, didn't table...that was your wife's fault, your wife's 
solicitor's fault.  We can force tabling if you want...or we can leave it 
lying... 
client What d'you mean?  I'm not quite sure what you mean. 
solicitor It's just a technical - it's a technical hearing and it allows us to put our 
defences in, it allows us to respond to the writ, what your wife said.  We 
haven't been able to do that because of a failure on your wife's solicitor's 
part. 
client Right.   What I wanted to see you about anyway was...eh....she's divorcing 
me, correct? 
solicitor Mm. 
client I don't want her to divorce me.  I want to divorce her because she was the 
one to blame. 
solicitor Right, OK. 
client You're saying it doesn't matter, but it matters to me because she's going to 
say things that are just not on, you know.  She has no grounds for divorce, 
I have. 
solicitor I will deny them.  I realise that.  I know your position as far as your wife's 
concerned, I know that sometimes she's maybe not very coherent, she's ill, 
I think, isn't she? 
client Uhu, she is ill. 
solicitor It's just expensive. 
client I know, but at the same time I don't want her getting a divorce on her 
grounds -  
solicitor Yes. 
client  - and my behaviour, it's just not on. 
solicitor Well, we can defend the divorce, although I'm not very happy, I don't 
normally give that advice to people.  I think you're wasting your money, 
you've got to look -  
client How's it going to look, she gets the divorce because of what she says 
about me? 
solicitor Right. 
client That's destroying my character, it's just not on. 
solicitor No, it's not a character assassination, it's a bit of paper you get at the end 
of the divorce, and I'm sure I've said this to you, it says that the pursuer is 
granted decree of divorce from the defender, that's all it says.  It doesn't go 
into whether you've been a bad guy and whether she's been wronged 
or....there's no blame attached. 
client But then it's going to go down as that, surely?  She's going to get a 
divorce.  She gets the divorce. 
solicitor Mm, you both get a divorce. 
client Ah but, who's actually, who's to blame? 
solicitor It doesn't matter. 
client Why? 
solicitor It just doesn't..... 
client Surely if it says that....she's going to say anyway that I've been a bad guy 
to her for the last six or seven years and the judge is going to look at this 
and say, "He is a bastard", right? 
solicitor Right. 
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client "So, I'm going to sort him out when it comes to a settlement", and it's just 
not on. 
solicitor No, right, OK, I see what you're getting at now.  It does not affect 
financial settlement in divorce.  It doesn't have any influence on the way 
the judge decides where the money goes.  There's a no-blame system of 
divorce in Scotland and it will not make any difference to the sum that she 
gets, if she gets anything.  It's as simple as that. 
client You see I have good grounds for divorce. 
solicitor I know that, most people have usually, both sides have usually good 
grounds.... 
client Aha, I have, she hasn't. 
solicitor Yes.  I can defend the divorce, OK? 
client Uhu. 
solicitor It's a waste of money.  You want to get divorced from your wife, why not 
let her divorce you?  The marriage has broken down, hasn't it? 
client And what's going to happen in court, when she turns round to me...turns 
round and says that my behaviour has been contributory to our divorce, 
that means I have to accept that? 
solicitor There will be no hearing on it, there'll be no hearing on the evidence of 
the breakdown of the marriage, so you won't have to go through that. 
client No, but she's going to state this, I mean somebody's going to read that, 
surely. 
solicitor Yes, they'll put it in affidavits.  It doesn't affect the financial settlement. 
client As far as I'm concerned there shouldn't be one anyway, you - she's the one 
that walked out, she's the one that's committed adultery, she is the one 
that...her mother does not want to know, her brother does not want to 
know, her daughter does not want to know.  She phoned her daughter last 
week and X’s told her she did not want to speak to her at all. 
solicitor Right, right.  Well, I'll put it in practical terms then.  If we defend the 
divorce and we raise our own action -  
client Right. 
solicitor  - the cost will cost you another £2000.  That's it in practical terms and 
we'll get the same outcome, only we'll be £2000 poorer off for it. 
client Right.  It's not going to cost me any more the other way?  Is she going to 
get....see, the likes of my position just now, I mean the house is in my 
name, is she going to have claim on that? 
 
This dialogue raises a number of perplexing issues for students.  On a fairly overt 
level there is the issue of legal jargon (‘tabling’), of how to explain legal process to 
clients, and how to advise on the law correctly.  But there is a subtext to this difficult 
dialogue: the lawyer wants one method of achieving the outcome of divorce, the client 
another.  For the client, the method of divorce is crucial, and his concern for this rests 
upon a moral economy which is based upon culpa.  In his view his wife is morally 
culpable for the breakdown of the marriage, and he adduces in support of this the 
views of his interpretive community, the family group.  His perception of the case is 
thus significantly different from that of his solicitor.   
 
On the solicitor’s part there is an implicit searching for motive as to why the client 
wants to defend the divorce.  The lawyer eventually attributes it to anxiety about 
financial penalty (‘OK, I see what you’re getting at now’...); but the client, as the rest 
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of the excerpt and the interview shows, is concerned primarily about the morality of 
the divorce process, not only the financial losses he may incur.  There is a dichotomy 
here between the lawyer’s teleological and pragmatic view of the law and his role as 
agent or hired gun, and the client’s sense that justice has been denied him - a sense 
that leads him to insist on putting in defences to a divorce he actually desires.  What is 
happening here corresponds exactly to Felstiner and Sarat’s description of clients 
talking past their lawyers, and where ‘interpretive activity proceeds without the 
generation and ratification of a shared understanding of reality’ (quoted above).  
Through discussion of this ‘interpretive activity’, students began to come to an 
understanding of the importance of point of view and the motives underlying it: the 
lawyer’s, the client’s, their own in learning, mine as their tutor. 
 
Students’ understanding of these issues was affected by the medium of the narrative, 
to the extent that there were significant differences between their reading of the above 
dialogue as text and as video dialogue.  Students were asked to read the text before 
coming to the class; and in discussion of the interview structure before they viewed 
the videotape, a number commented that the client seemed to dominate the interview.  
They were right of course: the interview is client-led, and this gave rise to an 
interesting discussion about dialogue structure and how, from their reading of the text, 
the students could discern this domination when on the face of it, the dialogue seems 
to be evenly distributed between lawyer and client.  But they also commented after 
they had seen the tape that their point about client domination would not have been so 
apparent from viewing the videotape alone.  This may have been a function of the 
fixed camera position, where for reasons of confidentiality only the lawyer appeared 
in the frame; or it may have been that the visual presentation of the conflict between 
lawyer and client made structural analysis of the dialogue more difficult to discern.  It 
is clear, though, that using dialogue as textual narrative has advantages for micro-
analysis of, and self-presentation within, language, that use of video dialogue does not 
easily accommodate.  Students began to discern the meta-narratives, the ‘“largely 
latent meaning structures”’ which Caesar-Wolf described above (p.6).  And vice 
versa, of course: as videotaped dialogue, the narrative was transformed and presented 
students with physical and aural presences, as well as the affective interaction 
between lawyer and client, which textual narrative cannot convey so well.   
 
I have shown this video clip to a number of student groups, and more often than not 
they are affected and troubled by the dissonance between lawyer and client.  What 
helps them to understand the structure of the interview, and the moral basis of the two 
positions is an awareness of reader-response and point of view - the lawyer’s, the 
client’s, and their own.  As we shall see, this was borne out by student comment in the 
self-appraisal reports.   
 
 
Recipes 
If the two narrative devices helped students to analyse others’ tapes and scripts as well 
as their own, they also enabled them to develop reflection-in-practice.  One such 
practical application was the use of ‘recipes’.  As Robert Putnam defined them, these 
are ‘sentence fragment[s] with a characteristic wording that can be used to design 
interventions for some class of situations’.  The idea of ‘recipes’ is in one respect a 
modern version of the ancient link between rhetoric and mnemonics; but set within 
the cognitive framework of Schön’s reflection theory.  Recipes are one way for 
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learners to move from what Schön identifies as Model I theory of action (where four 
values are dominant: rationality, winning, suppressing negative feelings, achieving 
personal goals) to a Model II theory of action (where values of free but informed 
choice, internal commitment and valid information are the dominant values).  Most 
people acknowledge the importance of Model II values but have difficulty in enacting 
them.37  Recipes are one way to achieve the shift from one model to another, and to 
embed reflective learning within the practice situation.38   
 
As always with Schön’s ideas, the process by which students came to an 
understanding of practice is critical.  When this heuristic was used with a class the 
previous year, I asked students to read Putnam’s article, then come to the class 
prepared to work with the idea.  The subsequent class was not successful: students 
arrived complaining that the article was theory-laden, that they didn’t see its relevance 
to law, and that they could not see what they were supposed to put into practice.  They 
were right to complain.  In the middle of a reflection-based module they were being 
asked to learn according to a version of technical-rationality education, as Schön 
termed it - not so much reflection in or on action as reflection before action.  The next 
year the module ran, I removed Putnam’s article from the class reading, made no 
mention of it in advance of the workshop where I introduced the idea, and introduced 
the idea in discussion of a student’s video.  The idea was instantly adopted by other 
students as useful and one which each of them could adapt to their own versions of 
artistry.  In the middle of a role play which was developing much like the excerpt 
above, for example, one student recognised the value of the phrase, ‘why do you want 
me to do this for you?’.  Out of the subsequent class discussion arose a number of the 
points that Putnam raises in his article concerning the advantages of recipes (they are 
memorable; can act creatively to shift or reframe a dialogue); and their dangers (they 
can be used mechanically; they can be a form of ‘covert advocacy’, inducing 
‘defensiveness and polarisation’).39   
 
 
Conclusion 
In this module students were given a three-week introduction to client counselling, 
one which , by using narrative theory and reflection theory, they began to learn the 
practice of counselling, and began to integrate this experience with other activities 
that lawyers carry out in practice, such as writing and negotiation.  Most students 
found the use of narrative devices helpful in understanding the dynamics of client 
counselling, and in integrating interviewing with writing.  With reference to recipes, 
for instance, three students commented (and their comments are representative of the 
class response) -  
 
The first point I learned in Clinical Legal Skills was that I tend to over-react 
before I actually know what lies ahead ... I became a more responsive client 
counsellor ... I also developed the use of recipes to enable me to structure 
interviews effectively.   
 
One aspect in which I felt I failed to grasp the full potential was the use of 
recipes - if the client makes a mention of something relevant then it’s important 
that the interviewer should be aware of what questions he or she should be 
asking in relation to that subject. 
 
 14 
At no point [in the interview] did I have a proper recipe in my head.  I should 
have concentrated on this, rather than expecting this just to happen without any 
(real) effort. 
 
One student made the following acute distinction between learning from others and 
learning in her own experience which showed that, even if the unit had not entirely 
succeeded for her, the concepts of reflection in and on practice had probably given her 
greater insight into why this was so.   
I was amazed just how much I was able to learn just by watching other students’ 
role plays and seeing where they were going wrong or what good points I could 
learn from them, and I feel it is important to emphasise that practice was 
essential.  You became better at handling situations with experience.  One thing 
I would say about this unit is that although I became better at realising what I 
was doing wrong, I don’t feel that my actual performance improved.   
Another summed up how she had managed to embed the experience of the course in a 
situation outside the class, demonstrating impressive transference of learning:  
Once the unit was over, I was made aware of how useful counselling techniques 
can be.  An aunt of mine had received a letter from her old employers regarding 
her widow’s pension.  Many of the material details were inaccurate [examples 
cited].  I was asked to draft a letter to her employers.  When discussing this with 
my aunt I found myself making very effective use of counselling skills and 
managed to gather several details which, although my aunt did not think them 
important, I thought them relevant.  This made me realise how much I had 
learned and how useful the unit had been for me. 
 
With more time, it would have been possible to have carried out more detailed 
analysis of the process of interviewing.  Students could, for example, begin to 
understand how to perform linguistic analysis of text and how to carry out an 
ethnomethodological analysis of interview scripts and tapes.40  The use of turn-taking 
in conversation, of silence, interpolation, voice inflection, genderlect and much else 
that is the subject of linguistic discourse analysis could be shown to students as a 
subject of legal research, and one which they could validly undertake should they 
wish to do so.41  In the future, some of this material will be included in a ‘Narrative 
and Law’ option contained in the Jurisprudence course, also a third level module. 
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